

V.—Rome and the "Road of Hercules"

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The ancient route across southern Gaul was associated by tradition with Hercules. Hannibal followed the same route and encouraged the belief that he was a second Hercules. The Alpine passes were unsafe until the time of Augustus. The Riviera route went through difficult country and was not suitable for use by armies. After 178 B.C. small parties were able to proceed by land to Monaco and continue their journey by sea. Armies regularly embarked at Genoa or Vada. West of the Rhone the land route was used by Romans during the second century B.C. Caesar's conquest of Gaul, which arose out of the strategy of the "Road of Hercules," at the same time put an end to the strategic problem.

Hannibal's march upon Italy gave the Romans shocking proof of the strategic value of the route across southern Gaul and the Alps. Control of this route was, in fact, the main problem of Rome's strategy in the West until Caesar extended the military frontier to the Rhine. Long before Hannibal's time, however, Greek myths had associated the name of Hercules with the march across Gaul and the passage of the Alps.¹

Hannibal's propaganda based upon these associations forms an important, though incidental, chapter in the history of what may be called the "Road of Hercules." The tenth of Hercules' canonical labors was to bring back the cattle of Geryon from the "Red Isles" at the western edge of the world. There is a reference to his journey thither from the Caucasus in a fragment of Aeschylus.² The return from the West across Spain, Gaul, and the Alps, had a sequel in the familiar Roman legend of Cacus and the theft of the cattle. The hero left various traces of his passing. The name 'Monaco' is a survival of the ancient Hercules *Monoecus* ("living alone") at the foot of the Maritime Alps. The legendary background in this instance is unknown; Jullian has suggested that a local native divinity was associated by Massiliote visitors with Hercules.³ The Graian Alps, through which the Little St. Bernard pass ran, were aetiologically explained as a reminder of Hercules *Graius*.⁴

¹ Cf. C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule* (Paris, 1909) 1.223-226 (referred to hereafter as *HG*).

² Str. 4.1.7.

³ Str. 4.6.3; cf. Serv. *Aen.* 6.829; Jullian, *HG* 1.397.

⁴ Nep. *Hann.* 3.4.

One tradition stated that Hannibal used the same pass as Hercules in crossing the Alps.⁵ The parallel between the exploits of Hercules and Hannibal must have been apparent to every educated person of the time. Hannibal made a formal beginning of his march upon Italy by visiting the shrine of Hercules at Gades and invoking the hero as his patron.⁶ He was proposing the obvious parallel in setting out from Gades.⁷ This region was the ultimate West beyond the Pillars of Hercules; there was even a tradition that the true Pillars were at Gades.⁸ Hannibal followed the "Road of Hercules" from Spain across the Pyrenees, southern Gaul, and the Alps.⁹ In crossing the Alps he performed labors in the heroic manner; one of these, perhaps not quite understood by later writers, was the famous fracturing of the side of the cliff with "vinegar."¹⁰

Hannibal's association of himself with Hercules may be inferred from Livy and Polybius. Livy's report of Scipio's speech to his soldiers before the Battle of the Ticinus contains these words: *Experiri iuvat . . . utrum Hannibal hic sit aemulus itinerum Herculis, ut ipse fert, an vectigalis stipendiariusque et servus populi Romani a patre relictus.*¹¹ It is plain that *ut ipse fert* is an echo from the primary sources and indicates Hannibal's desire to encourage belief in his relation to, if not identity with, Hercules. Hannibal and his Greek entourage no doubt hoped that their propaganda would influence Rome's Greek allies in Italy. The idea that a human leader might be a manifest divinity or a son of a god was current in Hellenistic thought at this time. Since Hercules Invictus and Hercules Victor were among the oldest cults of Rome,¹² the comparison of Hannibal with Hercules would suggest that Rome's patron god was ranged on Hannibal's side. This is perhaps why the Carthaginian's pretensions receive only oblique reference in our sources, all of which represent the Roman point of view. Hence, also, Polybius' sharp denunciation of certain unnamed writers who

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Liv. 21.21.9: *Gadibus profectus Herculi vota exsolvit novisque se obligat votis si cetera prospera evenissent.*

⁷ Liv. 21.22.5.

⁸ Str. 3.5.5.

⁹ Cf. A. Berthelot, "Itinéraire d'Hannibal à travers la Gaule," *REA* 37 (1935) 185-204.

¹⁰ Liv. 21.37.2.

¹¹ Liv. 21.47.7.

¹² Cf. J. Bayet, *Les origines de l'Hercule romain* (Paris, 1926); J. G. Winter, "The Myth of Hercules at Rome," *Univ. Michigan Stud.*, Human. Ser. 4 (1910) 171-273.

exaggerated beyond credibility the difficulties encountered by Hannibal. These difficulties, Polybius remarks, were such that the writers themselves became involved in an impasse; to extricate themselves (and Hannibal) they were forced to resort to the tragic *deus ex machina* in the form of a god or a hero.¹³ This god or hero was undoubtedly Hercules.

After the defeat of Hannibal, the "Road of Hercules" became essential to Rome's control of the Spanish provinces. There were three distinct areas involved in the subsequent problem of communication between Italy and Spain by way of Gaul: the Alps, notably the Cottian Alps (Mons Matriona, the modern Mt. Genève) and the Graian Alps (Little St. Bernard);¹⁴ the coastal or Riviera route along which the Via Julia ran in imperial times;¹⁵ and the territory west of the Rhone through which the construction of the Via Domitia was begun immediately after the Roman conquests of 125-121 B.C.¹⁶

The Alpine area may be considered first. It was not brought under Roman control until the time of Augustus. There is a possibility that Gaius Gracchus proposed to open the road through the territory of the Salassi and across into southern Gaul by way of the Little St. Bernard.¹⁷ This would have given the Romans an approach to the future province from the north down the valley of the Isère to the Rhone.¹⁸ It was one of the best of the Alpine passes and according to Strabo was practicable for wagons.¹⁹ With the fall of the Gracchan party this project was apparently abandoned.

¹³ Plb. 3.47.8, 48.8-9.

¹⁴ For a general discussion of the Alpine passes, see W. W. Hyde, "Roman Alpine Routes," *Mem. Amer. Philos. Soc.* 2 (1935), esp. 50-55 for Mt. Genève.

¹⁵ Cf. Hall, *op. cit.* (see note 30 below) 170-178. Hall's description of geography and topography and many of his inferences based on an intimate acquaintance with the country are valuable; on questions involving archaeology, epigraphy, and literary sources, he is less reliable.

¹⁶ For the roads of southern Gaul in general, cf. A. Grenier, *Manuel d'archéologie préhistorique, celtique, et gallo-romaine* (Paris, 1934) 6.1.26-33. Useful reproductions of pertinent sections from the Tables of Peutinger will be found in *REA* 14 (1912), plates I-VIII; see also E. Desjardins, *Géographie historique et administrative de la Gaule romaine* (Paris, 1876-93) 4.120-159.

¹⁷ This may be inferred from Gaius' campaigns against the Salassi (Plu. *CG* 8). Cf. discussion by Hyde, *op. cit.* (see note 14 above) 60-66.

¹⁸ The conquest of southern Gaul appears to have been in large part a Gracchan project. Cf. discussion and references, Coleman H. Benedict, "The Romans in Southern Gaul," *AJPh* 63 (1942) 38-50.

¹⁹ 4.6.7.

Before Caesar's campaign of 58 B.C. we have positive record of only one crossing by a Roman general with an army, namely Pompey. The tone of his report to the Senate suggests that such a crossing was a feat equal to that of Hannibal (and no doubt by implication to that of Hercules).²⁰ We may reject the suggestion of Jullian that Fulvius Flaccus crossed into southern Gaul over the pass of Mt. Genève through the Cottian Alps in 125 B.C. Jullian's inference is based on the order in which the peoples defeated by Fulvius appear in the *Fasti Triumphales: de ligVRIBVS VOCONTEIS SALLVVEISQ.* . . .²¹ "Sur sa route," Jullian explains, "le long de la Durance, il traversa ou soumit sans peine les tribus ligures et gauloises."²² The principal objection to this interpretation is that the Alpine tribes, whenever we have precise accounts, were not overcome *sans peine*.²³ We may infer that a Roman general who had pressing business elsewhere would not take the time to force his way across the Alps when he might readily transport his troops by sea along the Ligurian coast. This, as we shall see later, was the regular procedure in the republican period. As to the order in which the defeated nations are listed—assuming that the order has any significance—it is equally possible that Fulvius landed at the mouth of the Argens, marched north to the valley of the Durance and, after defeating the Vocontii, struck at the Saluvii from the rear.²⁴

The Alpine passes and other routes not under Roman control could, of course, be used by individuals or small parties, but only at some risk and by leave of the natives. In 57 B.C. Caesar sent Galba to open up the Little St. Bernard because of the excessive tolls and the dangers to which merchants were subjected.²⁵ Polybius, if he actually crossed by a major Alpine pass, did what traders and travellers could easily do.²⁶ But the passage of an army was another matter. If the leader of the army was not prepared to pay the toll,

²⁰ Sall. *Ep. Cn. Pompei* (ed. Üssner 1893) 4; cf. App. *BC* 1.109; Varro *ap. Serv. Aen.* 10.13.

²¹ *CIL* 1².1, page 49.

²² Jullian, *HG* 3.11, note 5.

²³ In Hannibal's case, Liv. 21.32–37, Plb. 3.50–55; Pompey, see note 20 above; Caesar, *Gall.* 1.10.4–5.

²⁴ Hall, *op. cit.* (see note 30 below) 87–89; W. E. Heitland. *The Roman Republic*² (Cambridge, 1923) 2.330. The expressions *prima trans Alpes arma* (Flor. 1.37) and *primus Transalpinos* (Liv. *Epit.* 60) merely suggest that Flaccus fought on the other side of the Alps, not necessarily that he crossed them to do so.

²⁵ *Gall.* 3.1.2.

²⁶ Plb. (3.48.12) states simply that he crossed the Alps. Str. (4.6.12) quotes from a detailed description of the Alps by Polybius which we have apparently lost.

he would have to fight. Paying the toll was a recognition of the sovereignty of a petty Alpine tribe; a Roman general exercising the *imperium* vested in him by the senate and the Roman people could hardly be expected to acknowledge the inferiority of his authority to that of semi-civilized mountaineers. Sertorius and his party were held up in this manner while on their way to Spain; his companions objected that it was a shameful thing for a Roman proconsul to pay tribute to pestilent barbarians. Sertorius, however, was in a hurry and agreed to pay the toll.²⁷ Decimus Brutus, when he crossed into Gaul in 43 B.C. from northern Italy, was in no position to argue; the Salassi charged him a toll of one drachma per man in his army.²⁸

Since the Alpine passes could not be used freely until the time of Augustus, there remained only the coastal route for communication by land between Italy and Gaul during the republican period. The principal single barrier to the use of this route was between Monaco and Nice where the Maritime Alps end abruptly in the sea.²⁹ W. H. (Bullock) Hall, in his study *The Romans on the Riviera and the Rhone*,³⁰ has examined the evidence for the use of the land route along the Riviera, and concludes that its early use by an army was out of the question. Not until the first decade B.C. was there a good road along the coast between Gaul and Italy proper across the Maritime Alps (the Via Iulia); even then the Mt. Genève route was preferred because it was shorter and easier.³¹

Apart from the barrier interposed by the Maritime Alps, the main objection to the use of the coastal road along its entire length from Forum Iulii to Genoa and beyond was the rugged country, lacking in supplies and water, that had to be traversed. This route, as all who have travelled along the Riviera will recall, is not at all like the passage of the Alps. In the Alps, the roads usually lead up a valley until the watershed or pass is reached; after a stiff climb the pass is surmounted; then the road descends a valley on the other side. But along the French and Ligurian Riviera, the road must cross a series of rugged headlands; on the railway line there are innumerable tunnels.

²⁷ Plu. *Sert.* 6.3.

²⁸ Str. 4.6.7.

²⁹ Polybius speaks of the pass "nearest the Tyrrhenian Sea" as precipitous (Str. 4.6.12).

³⁰ London, 1898.

³¹ For evidence of use, see *CIL* 5.2, page 808; *CIL* 12, page 645 and inscr. 5496, 5500; Str. 4.1.3, 1.12; Jullian *HG* 1.46; see also note 67 below.

The contention that the Riviera road could not be used by Roman armies is confirmed by the experiences of the one army that did make the passage. After the retreat from Mutina in 43 B.C., Antony was hotly pursued by Decimus Brutus and Trebellius. He was anxious to join his forces with those of Lepidus in Gaul, but his retreat toward the Mt. Genèvre route was blocked. He had no recourse but to try the coastal route. His soldiers were appalled at the prospect of making the march. Plutarch tells how terribly Antony and his men suffered from hunger and thirst before they reached Forum Iulii.³²

This evidence makes it unlikely that the expedition of Opimius against the Oxybii and Deciatae in 154 proceeded by land, although this is what one would infer from the report of Polybius which states simply that Opimius collected his forces at Placentia, and marching across the Apennines reached the territory of the Oxybii.³³ This is too simple. Polybius either did not know the geographical facts, or he ignored them in accordance with his stated policy when strange country was involved.³⁴ Opimius certainly marched from Placentia across the Apennines to the coast and embarked his army, probably at Vada Sabatia (Vado, west of Genoa). The Oxybii and Deciatae lived west of the Maritime Alps in the neighborhood of Nice and Antibes; to attack them by land, Opimius would have had to make the hazardous march along the Ligurian Riviera and across the Maritime Alps. In addition, the account given by Polybius intimates that Opimius took the enemy by surprise. It is difficult to see how this could have been the case if his army had been struggling across the headlands between Monaco and Nice. The surprise, however, fits in very nicely with a sudden attack from the sea.³⁵ It is worth noting, incidentally, that the three commissioners who had been sent to remonstrate with the Oxybii and Deciatae some time before the expedition of Opimius were attacked when they *landed*.³⁶

So far as individuals or small parties were concerned, the principal barrier to travel along the coastal road was, as we have seen,

³² Plu. *Ant.* 17.5-6.

³³ 33.10.1-5.

³⁴ 3.36.3.

³⁵ Hall, *op. cit.* (see note 30) 82. But Jullian (*HG* 1.520-21), M. Clerc, *Massalia* (Marseille, 1927-9) 2.32, and A. Donnadieu and P. Coussin, "Aegitna et le monument de Biot," *RA* 6^{me} sér. 1 (1931) 69-101, assume that Opimius proceeded by land. The evidence for the use of the coastal route as a whole makes this improbable.

³⁶ Plb. 33.8.

the mountainous stretch between Monaco and Nice. The normal procedure in travelling from Italy to Gaul or Spain appears to have been to sail from some port on the Italian side. Scipio sailed from Pisa in 218;³⁷ Polybius implies that he sailed back to that port in order to reach the valley of the Po for the first battle with Hannibal.³⁸ Apparently the passes over the Apennines between Vada or Genoa and the Po valley were not yet open.³⁹ Cato in 195 was supposed to have sailed from Luna.⁴⁰

Early in the second century both the sea route and the land route were menaced by the Ligurian natives. Rome hoped, perhaps, that Massilia would be able to protect this area. In 181 B.C., however, the Massiliotes complained to Rome that the Ligurian pirates were more than they could manage.⁴¹ Aggressive campaigns by the Romans between 181 and 178 gave them control of the coast westward to Monaco and swept the pirates from the seas.⁴² Road building in northern Italy made Genoa accessible by the inland route.⁴³ Thereafter it was possible to sail from Genoa, Vada Sabatia, or Monaco, to some point west of the Maritime Alps. The Romans, to be sure, might have built a good road along the coast to replace the trail they were forced to use, but it is evident that they were aware of an important strategical consideration: a good road between Italy and Gaul would have made it easier for Roman armies to reach Gaul, but it would also have made it easier for Gallic armies to reach Italy.⁴⁴ While the sailing was inconvenient, it was a necessary concession to the safety of Italy. Small parties might proceed as far as Monaco on foot; an army would probably be embarked at Genoa or Vada.

The story of Hostilius Mancinus, recounted by Livy and Valerius Maximus, confirms the supposition that small parties might proceed to Monaco. As Hostilius was engaged in the usual religious cere-

³⁷ Plb. 3.41.4.

³⁸ Plb. 3.61.3.

³⁹ These low passes would be open after 178 B.C.; cf. notes 42, 43, below.

⁴⁰ Liv. 34.8.4.

⁴¹ Liv. 40.18.4.

⁴² Beginning of campaigns, Liv. 40.26; cf. *CIL* 5.2, pages 894-901.

⁴³ Cf. *DS s.v.* "Via": V. Chapot, "Routes d'Italie"; Heitland, *op. cit.* (see note 24 above) 334-5; Str. 5.1.11. The Via Aemilia Lepidi from Ariminum to Placentia was begun in 187 B.C.; the Via Aemilia from Placentia to Genoa via Dertona was begun in 148, *CIL* 5.2, pages 935, 946; the Via Aemilia Scauri from Dertona to Vada, 109 B.C., Str. *loc. cit.*, *CIL* 5.2, pages 827, 885, 892, 993.

⁴⁴ Plu. *Aem.* 6.2.

monies preparatory to setting out for his *provincia* in Spain, the sacred chickens escaped into the woods and eluded recapture. Hostilius ignored this evil omen and made his way to Monaco on foot. He was about to embark at this point when a voice *sine ullo auctore* called out "Mancine, manel!" In consternation he retraced his steps to Genoa and embarked there.⁴⁵ Apparently, then, it was convenient in 137 B.C. to go on foot to Monaco, but from that point westward it was necessary to sail to some port from which it was safe or convenient to proceed by land.

The Romans, however, were not good sailors. In 218 B.C. Scipio, after landing at the mouth of the Rhone, had to delay in order to allow his men to recover from *iactatio maritima*.⁴⁶ Navigation in the winter months was dangerously uncertain and often had to be abandoned.⁴⁷ A letter written by Asinius Pollio to Cicero on March 16, 43 B.C. illuminates the problem of communications between Italy and Spain. Pollio, writing from Corduba, complained that his couriers were being held up in Italy and Gaul, presumably by Antony and Lepidus. This meant that the land route was blocked, and since navigation had been suspended for the winter, Pollio had heard nothing of what had happened in Italy since the preceding November.⁴⁸

We may conclude, then, that the Romans made the maritime section of the journey from Italy to Gaul as short as possible. After the Maritime Alps had been passed, the first convenient landing place was Nicaea (Nice). In this area the Massiliotes had long had a foothold, and were nominally supposed to control the coast westward to their city. There appears to have been a road or trail along or near the coast which could be used, assuming that the disposition of the natives permitted travel by land.⁴⁹ But the conditions under which the Alpine roads were used no doubt applied here as well. Individuals might proceed at their own risk, but the difficulty of the road itself and the necessity of fighting the natives did not commend

⁴⁵ Liv. *Epit.* 55; Val. Max. 1.6.7.

⁴⁶ Liv. 21.26.5.

⁴⁷ Cf. Veg. *Mil.* 4.39.

⁴⁸ *Fam.* 10.31.

⁴⁹ This is to be inferred from Str. 4.6.3, where he states that the Ligurians had barred all the passes leading to Spain that ran along the seaboard. It was only after eighty years of war that the Romans succeeded in opening up a right of way with a breadth of 12 stades for those travelling on public business. Earlier Strabo (4.1.5) states that in 124 B.C. Sextius was able only to force the barbarians to retire 12 stades from the coast, and in rugged places, only 8.

the land route to use by armies. Apparently it was impossible for Massilia to keep the natives under control. In 189 B.C. the praetor Lucius Baebius was attacked somewhere on the land road; he died three days later in Massilia.⁵⁰ In 154 B.C., as we have noted, the Oxybii and Deciatae attacked the Massiliote colonies at Nicaea (Nice) and Antipolis (Antibes). The natives were defeated by Opimius and forced to cede territory to Massilia and to give hostages as a guarantee of their good conduct in the future.⁵¹

The campaign of 154 probably ensured the safety of the harbors in the region of Nice and Antibes and provided additional security for those who were making the journey between Italy and Gaul by sea. The coastal trail westward, however, was still controlled by the natives. From the site of what was later Forum Iulii (Fréjus) a trail ran inland through the territory of the Saluvii.⁵² In imperial times this was known as the Via Aurelia.⁵³ At Aquae Sextiae (Aix-en-Provence) this road was joined by another that came northward from Massilia. Together they reached the Rhone at the first point where it could be crossed above the Delta. The Saluvii appear to have been partly Celtic and partly Ligurian.⁵⁴ As Ligurians, at any rate, they were natural enemies of Rome. When Rome took decisive action in 125-124, the Saluvii were obliterated as a sovereign community.⁵⁵

Continuing west of the Rhone, the road ran through the territory of the Volcae. Immediately after the conquests of 125-121 Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus began the improvement of this road; it was known consequently as the Via Domitia.⁵⁶ The Volcae were the most Hellenized of the Gauls and had developed some degree of

⁵⁰ Liv. 37.57.1-2.

⁵¹ See notes 33, 34, 35, above.

⁵² Jullian, *HG* 3.37, note 2 infers the existence of such a road from Caesar (*Civ.* 1.87.5), and Str. (4.6.3; cf. 4.6.12), and the choice made by the Teutons in 102. Roman roads in Gaul followed ancient trails for the most part. It takes very little traffic to maintain a recognizable trail. No doubt the road from Forum Iulii to the Rhone (Via Aurelia) and thence to Spain (Via Domitia) was in use centuries before the Romans took them over. It is misleading to say, for example, that Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus "built" the Via Domitia. He no doubt initiated and organized the improvement of the old road according to Roman standards, but it was still being worked on in the time of Fonteius (see note 68, below). The verb describing this activity was *munire*.

⁵³ Cf. Grenier, *op. cit.* (see note 16, above) 29-32.

⁵⁴ Str. 4.6.3, "Ligues" or "Celtoligues."

⁵⁵ See note 24, above.

⁵⁶ Grenier, *op. cit.* (see note 16, above) 26-29.

urban civilization.⁵⁷ We may assume that Rome, as a partner of Massilia, early had an understanding with the Volcae about the right of way along the "Road of Hercules." Polybius stated that by his time (before 125 B.C.) the Romans had improved the road and had measured it out with milestones.⁵⁸ The authenticity of this statement has been questioned, but there are cogent arguments in its favor.⁵⁹ This history of Rome's relations with the Volcae, so far as our evidence extends, was one of friendship. The Volcae, it will be recalled, tried to stop Hannibal in 218 B.C.⁶⁰ This was the kind of assistance for which the Roman senate had a long memory. In the war of 125–121 there is no record of action against the Volcae. The colony of Narbo was founded in 118 B.C. near their chief town, Montlaurès.⁶¹ In later times another of their towns, Nemausus (Nîmes), was accorded preferential treatment.⁶² They were members of the Arvernian confederacy which Rome destroyed in 121 B.C.,⁶³ but it is not certain that their participation in this pan-Gallic league was *ipso facto* an act hostile to Rome.

In 125 B.C. the Saluvii raided Massiliote territory. While the Epitome of Livy (60) states that this was the cause of the war that followed, there is no doubt that the promptness and vigor with which Rome acted was evidence of a larger strategic problem. The campaigns of the first two seasons destroyed the Saluvii as a nation and placed control of the east-west road from Forum Iulii in Roman hands. The first step in consolidating this control was the establishment of a garrison at Aquae Sextiae in 123 B.C.⁶⁴ Thereafter

⁵⁷ As the remains of Montlaurès show. This was a natural acropolis about 4 km. west of Narbo (Narbonne). The archaeological remains show a rich variety of articles dating from the sixth to the end of the second century B.C. Cf. Clerc, *op. cit.* (see note 35) 1.348–9; P. Jacobsthal and E. Neuffer, "Recherches sur l'hellénisation de la Provence," *Préhistoire*, Tome 2, fasc. 1 (1933); R. Demangel, "Un oppidum des Volques Arécomiques" (Murviel, 10 km. west of Montpelier), *REA* 36 (1934) 213. For the Hellenization of the Celts, cf. Justin. 43.4.1; Str. 4.1.5.

⁵⁸ 3.39.8.

⁵⁹ The following regard it as genuine: T. Mommsen, *CIL* 5.2, page 785; O. Hirschfeld, "Die römischen Meilensteine," *Kleine Schriften* (Berlin, 1913) 703–743, esp. 706 and note 2; O. Kuntz, *Polybius und sein Werk* (Leipzig, 1902) 21; R. Thommen, "Abfassungszeit der Geschichten des Polybius," *H* 20 (1885) 216–218; A. Berthelot, *op. cit.* (see note 9, above).

⁶⁰ Liv. 21.26.6.

⁶¹ See note 57, above.

⁶² Str. 4.1.12.

⁶³ Str. 4.2.3.

⁶⁴ For a description of the campaigns, see Heitland, *op. cit.* (see note 24, above) 330–333; Benedict, *op. cit.* (see note 18, above). Founding of Aquae Sextiae, Str. 4.1.5; Liv. *Epit.* 61.

Roman armies could be disembarked at Forum Iulii. However, the coast between Forum Iulii and the area around Antibes and Nice was policed only with difficulty and could not be used by armies because of the rugged terrain.⁶⁵ We may assume that Marius, for example, brought his armies in 104 B.C. by ship either to Forum Iulii or the mouth of the Rhone. The canal dug by his soldiers placed Arles within reach of marine transport.⁶⁶ In the course of time Rome's control of all the regions between Gaul and Italy was established, but it is worth noting that when both the western Alpine passes and the coastal roads were available, travellers preferred the roads which crossed by the passes of Mt. Genève (Mons Matrona), Mt. Cenis, or the Little St. Bernard.⁶⁷

The strategic problem in southern Gaul was clearly indicated by Cicero in his defence of Fonteius, governor of Gaul from 75 to 73 B.C. Fonteius' chief task was to ensure the safety of communications between Italy and Spain. The maintenance of the Via Domitia which followed the "Road of Hercules" west of the Rhone was a strategic necessity according to Cicero.⁶⁸ Similar strategic necessities formed the background (or pretext) for Caesar's dealing with the Helvetii.⁶⁹ His eventual conquest of Gaul moved the strategic area from the southern coast to the Rhine and ended the problem of communication along the "Road of Hercules."

⁶⁵ Str. 4.6.3 states that the road was scarcely practicable for armies and that the Romans had difficulty in making it available for those travelling on public business. Antony's army had serious difficulties in this region (see reference note 32, above).

⁶⁶ Str. 4.1.8.

⁶⁷ Cf. "The Goblets of Vicarello," in Desjardins, *op. cit.* 4, chap. 1, and Grenier, *op. cit.* (see note 16, above) 120-125; *Itinerarium Hierosolymitanum*, in Desjardins, *op. cit.* chap. 4, and Grenier, *op. cit.* 141-144. Ammianus Marcellinus (15.10.2-8) described the dangers of the passes in winter (in spite of which the coastal route was not used). Sidonius Apollinaris (*Epist.* 1.5) went to Italy by one of the St. Bernard passes, probably the lesser. With the exception of the Vicarello Itinerary, these are late records, but they indicate the preference for the major Alpine passes rather than the Riviera route.

⁶⁸ *Font.* 18.

⁶⁹ *Gall.* 1.10.2.